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IN THE

Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah

I. R. STRINGHAM, et al.,

Appellants,
PETITION
FOR

-vs-

REHEARING
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal

Case No. 7162

Corporation

Respondent.

The appellants respectfully petition for a rehearing
In this cause based upon the following errors in the
decision of the court dated January 17, 1949.
1. The court erred in stating and holding that
Section 15-8-26, U.C.A., 1943, gives authority for regulaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
tion of signs such as those involved in this proceeding,
Section 15-8-23 being the section under "\vhich signs must
be regulated.
2. The Court eTred in _holding that no aspect of
unreasonableness or abritrary or capricious action ap'pears from the pleadings herein, which specifically allege
that there are no grounds· or reasons for classifying the
signs of the appellants on a reasonable or logical basis
or on a factual basis.
3. N O\vhere does the opinion of this court give any
reason or indicate any basis for an alleged classification
m.ade by Salt Lake City which can be upheld by this
Court.

ARGUMENT
I.

TIIE COURT ERRED IN STATING AND HOLDING
THAT SECTION. 15-8-26, U.C.A., 1943, GIVES AUTHORITY FOR REGULATION OF SIGNS SUCH AS THOSE
INVOLVED IN THIS PROCEEDING, SECTION 15-8-23
BErNG TIIE SECTION UNDER \VHICH SIGNS MUST
BE REGULATED.

Unde-r point 3 of its opinion the court refers to the
statutory authority for regulating use of the streets
and makes this stateraent:
''It is under these Code sections that the
City seeks to control the use of the streets and
pass such an oTdinahce as Section 5720. There
are, by the Code several classes of structures:
rr-hose covered by Sec. 15-8-26, include signs and
signposts snch as are involved here, as distinguished frorn overhead signs covered by Sec.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
13-8-23, and incidentally by Sec. 5731 of the City
Ordinances. The classifiea tion is one seleeted by
the legislature.''
Section 13-8-::?:i specifically relates to signs and signposts.
In face of this specific statement of legislative policy,
it is beyond the authority of Salt Lake ·City to regulate
signs under another section of the statute which deals
"'ith obstructions.
Statutory language should he given its ordinary
meaning if that is plain or reasonable. Nothing in the
statutes suggests that signs can be obstructions rather
than signs and therefore be regulated under Section
15-8-23 rather than 15-8-26. Section 26 provides as to
cities:
"Signs and Advertising }/[atter. They may
regulate or p~revent the use of streets, sidewalks,
public buildings and grounds for signs, signposts,
avvnings, horse troughs or racks, or for posting
handbills or advertisements.''
Nothing in this language restricts this section to overhanging signs or to signs above the streets or otherwise.
This is the section under which the signs of appellants
should be either regulated or prevented upon a classification which is reasonable.
Section 15-8-23 plainly does not authorize the city to
regulate these signs in the face of Sectjon 26 vvhirh
deals specifically with that subject matter. In fac:t,
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Section 23 does not cover the problern at hand. The section reads as follows:
''Cleaning Property, Streets and Sidewalks.
They may regulate and control the UHe of sidewalks and all structures thereunder or thereover;
and they may require the owner or occupant, or
the agent of any owner or occupant, of p~roperty
to remove all weeds and noxious vegetation from
such property, and in front thereof to the curb
line of the street, and to keep the sidewalks in
front of such property free from litter, snow,
ice and obstructions."
The first clause relates to use of sidewalks and
structures thereunder or thereover. The signs of the
appellants are in the parking area and not in the sidewalk area. The next clause deals '\\ri th the area from the
front of an o"'rner's property to the curb line o.f the
street, which covers the area where appellants' signs are
located, but this authority is restricted to removal of
'·all \Veeds and noxious vegetation'' \Vhich these signs
plainly are not. The last clause again relates to side\valks only and permits the city to regulate them so
as to keep them ','free from litter, snovv, ice and obstructions." To classify the signs of appeHants as obstructions
to the sidewalks and torture the ordinance to come under
Section 15-8-23 is simply to ignore the plain provisions of
Section 15-8-26.
An_other rule of statutory interpretation requires
that sections of related laws eac:h be given full force and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

effect 'vhere that is possible. La Page v. United States,
(CCA-8 1945) 146 F. 2d 536, 156 A.L.R. 965; Western
Realty Co. v. City of Reno, .et al., (Nev. 1946) 172 P. 2d
13S, 161: Fuhr v. Oklahon1a City, et al., 194 Okla. 482,
153 P.2d 115, 117-118; 50 Am. Jur. 371-372.
This position is given importance through a consideration of the ordinances of ~Salt Lake City. Section
5720 originally classified as structures a.ll of the signs
involved in this proceeding although they were located
in the parking, and such signs were not p·rohibited but
'vere regulated. \Vithout any change in the facts (for
such are the allegations of the com1plaint), the city attempted to amend the ordinance and classify signs as
obstructions and prohibit them. If these signs were regulated under Section 15-8-23 along with other signs, in,
on, over, or about the streets of Salt Lake City there
would have to be a basis for classification. Appellants
ask no more. We allege arbitrary and discriminatory
action by Salt Lake City which is not denied hut is in
effect admitted by the demurrer. Ap.pellants are entitled
to a trial in this case so that the coui't can hear 'vha t
reason or lack of reason Salt Lake City will advance for
its allegedly arbitrary action in this matter, and if the
reason given can be accepted by reasonable p·ersons as a
basis for classification or distinction, then the action of
the city should stand. Appellants respectfully urge that
neither Sa.lt Lake City nor this Court has pointed out
a basis for the so-called classification made by the city.
Ancl, what is more to the point, appellants believe no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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6
legally sufficient basis can he advanced if the Court will
recognize that this involves a regulation of signs and not
the removal of obstructions.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO ASPECT
OF UNREASONABLENESS OR ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS ACTION APPEARS F·RO·M THE PLEADINGS
HEREIN, WHICH SPECIFICALLY. ALLE·GE THAT
THERE ARE NO GROUNDS OR REASONS FOR CLASSIFYING rHE SIGNS OF THE APPELLANTS ON A
REASONABLE OR LOGICAL BASIS OR ON A FACTUAL BASIS.

Under point 3 the Court says:
"We again call attention to the fact that the
order in the case before us was to remove all
signs from city parking, therefore no aspect of
unreasonableness appears from any arbitrary
or capricious action directed against some and
not all owners of similar signs. The element of
unreasonableness, if any, here involved is that
claimed by the appellants by virtue of their allegations in their complaint that certain facts which
might authorize and justify the removal of their
class of signs do not exist."
Appellants allege in their complaint that no logical
basis for classification exists and that none of the legitimate objectives of city government will he furthered by
the action in question. The ·com~plaint also alleges in
paragraph 11 (a) a number of uses, structures, and obstructions which are not prohibited by the ordinances
of Salt I.1ake City, including overhanging signs in the
congested portion of Salt I..1ake City which are not atSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I

tached to any buildings. Such signs are not distinguishable from the signs of the appellants on any logical hasis~.
...-\nd in paragraph 19 the complaint alleges that Salt Lake
City is acting arbitrarily and capriciously by compelling
the removal of the signs of the appellants and not the
removal of other signs "\vhich c-annot be distinguished
from the signs of the app~ellants on any reasonable basis.
III.

N"O\VHERE DOES THE OPINION O·F THIS COURT
GIVE ANY REASON OR INDICATE ANY BASIS F·OR
_.t\.N ...t\LLEGED CLA·SSIFICA.TIO·N lVIADE BY SALT
LAKE CITY \VHICH CAN BE UPHELD BY THIS
COURT.

If it is not necessary for Salt Lake City to support
its action in this case by a reas-onable classification or
hy action based upon reason, then appellants respectfully sub:mit that this Court should say so and let the
matter end there. The opinion of the C.ourt discusses
unreasonableness and classification and action in the
best interests of Salt Lake City vvithout onere stating
what the reason is, how the classification can be supported, or what interest of Salt Lake City can conceivahly be furthered by the action of the respondent.
The Court exp-resses the opinion that Salt Lake City
will not act arbitrarily and also suggests that the ci~-y
should draw the line in the almost innumerable uses
that are being made of the public streets in Salt. Lake
·City. A reading of the opinion impells the conclusion
that arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory act]on •
i~ not to hr pern1itted by this IIonorable Court.
If
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Salt Lake City can act arbitrarily with reference
to signs, then appellants submit that the complaint in
this case alleges such arbi tary action.
T~e following cases cited in our original brief hold
that cities cannot act arb[trarily and capriciously in
the matter of regulating streets~ Pickrell v. Carlis1e,
135 Ky. 128, 131, 121 S. W. 1029; French v. Cooper,
(1945) 133 N.J.L. 246, 34 Atl. 2d 880; Laura Vincent
Co. v. Citry of Selma, 43 Cal. App. 473, 11 P. 2d 17;
Breinig v. 'County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 482, 483,
2 Atl. 2d 842, 848, 849; People ex rel. Schimpff v. Norveil, 368 Ill. 325, 13 N.E. 2d 960, 961; 37 Am. J ur. 778.
CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully submit that if the court
will re-examine its opinion critically it will conclude
that the opinion written is not satisfactory. The opinion
places the regulatory po,ver of Salt Lake City under
the wrong statute and erroneously gets into a regulation on obstructions rather than a regulation on signs.
Of course, obstructions c.an he removed and the complaint alleges plainly that the signs are not obstructions. If the Court will further consider whether Salt
I ~ake City must act reasonably in the premises, this
Court will find that no such basis for classification
or discriminatory action appears in the Court's opinion
and such basis is denied in the allegations. of the complaint. The Court should grant. _a rehearing and upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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rehearing should rPver~e the judg1nent of the dish·i<'t
court and require Salt Lake City to answer the allegations of discrin1ination and arbitrary and capricious
action so that this Court can ultimately determine
w·hether Salt Lake City has been acting and is threatening no'v to act arbitrarily, cwpriciously and in a discriminatory manner in the matters which affect appellants.
RICHARDS and BIRD
Attorneys for Appellants
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